Contributor Vesting Pool Architecture

Proposals
#1

Following the community discussion regarding the YAM compensation, it’s become clear we need a comprehensive system to manage contributor vesting optionality. Due to the pushback on minting, it’s apparent that this is an action, if passed, that should be done extremely infrequently. As such, it’s my opinion that this initiative should be to create a Contributor Vesting Pool that creates a system for providing upside to contributors both current and future.

I believe this to be an exciting and innovative design and important DAO infrastructure that meets a critical need in the Yam organization without sacrificing our ideals of decentralization.

Basic Architecture
YAMs designated for contributor allocation and vesting would be sent to a smart contract controlled jointly by a multisig and the YAM Governor. All YAM initially sent to this contract would be unvested (locked) until called by a controller of the contract.

The controller of the contract is able to create specific vesting structures on a per address basis, drawing upon the total amount of unvested YAMs. This would allow for a specific vesting amount and schedule for a current contributor to differ in size and schedule from that of a later contributor of differing skill level.

The architecture will also allow for things like performance-based and signing bonuses.

Control of the Contract - Checks and Balances
The multisig will be able to structure and initiate these vesting allocations, though on a 5-day time delay, allowing for on-chain governance to have the opportunity to alter any decisions made by the multisig. Additionally, the multisig will create Snapshot votes for any vesting allocation it plans to enact. In this way, the Contributor Vesting Pool will balance efficiency and decentralization.

The Governor contract itself can at any time also create vesting allocations, as well as will have full control over any unvested YAMs in the contract.

Pool Size
This pool is meant to fund contributor upside for the duration of the protocol. While it could be added to in the future, it will be best to try to size it appropriately for the longevity of the protocol. Because it is vested, it will also not have an immediate impact on supply, and the majority of it will have no plans for vesting in the mid-term future. My personal preference would be to have this pool account for about 5-10% of the supply, leading to the contributor community in the entire lifespan of the protocol accounting for 5-10% of the supply. This is far lower than most team allocations of anywhere between 20-40% of a protocol’s supply, and is specifically not meant just for the current contributors, but to enable the protocol to continually attract talent in the long term.

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Draft Proposal: Compensation for Core Team & Contributors
Gov/Dev Call - 10/15 ( our first <3 ) - Feedback Requested!
#2

Very nice, what would be the estimated time to code and audit something like this? Is it already in the works?
This is the kind of structure that will make Yam become unstoppable.

#3

Seems like a great plan.

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#4

It hasn’t been started yet, I have a few things on my plate. Maybe this would be good for @flygoing.eth to start on? I am currently working on the OTC purchase of DPI & YCP contracts. I would say the hard part of figuring out the architecture is mostly done for this so it shouldn’t be more than a few days imo

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#5

Would also be helpful to design a dashboard showing the vested amount and the recipients. Also would be cool to give NFTs to contributors along with the fiscal rewards.

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#6

Yup, I can definitely get started on this

#7

I support this proposal, very good proposal

#8

任何提议，在想法成熟后，请用投资人的思维在思考一遍，

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#9

I second all the supports for this governance proposal. This is looking like a solid plan. Up!

#10

On further thinking, I think an access control architecture like this would be beneficial for YAM in other scenarios. Perhaps the treasury (or just an investment arm of it) could be put in a similar contract, where a multisig has a 5 day timelock control, and governance can override it to shutout the multisig and cancel any pending actions. Would allow for much more efficient (i.e. less on-chain governance) investments in general

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#11

I’ve actually been thinking the Multisig is not the right way to go for the contributor vesting pool.

It doesn’t offer many benefits of speed or agility, especially if we’re still using Snapshot, and increases our centralization+regulatory risk.

We’re also not going to be creating a TON of vesting proposals – it’ll be within the scope of what governance can handle, especially once we have LP voting.

We could create a new governor contract that has lower quorum requirements and higher time delays, though, with GovernorAlpha having oversight control. This achieves a similar goal as the multisig, but in a much more decentralized fashion.

But I do think you’re right, this general architecture can be used elsewhere – I think it’s a very exciting starting point of a greater architecture :slight_smile:

2 Likes
#12

I agree.

I know that this has been brought up before and generally it’s a good idea.
I’ll bring this up again when it’s more pertinent but is there way to build in a ragequit() for investments in the treasury? Let’s say we invest in DPI/ETH and set protocol finds a serious bug or issue with the DPI, there should be a way to unwind staking and sell investments into a stablecoin or ect.