YAMs Replanted and Rebased. What now?

100% in support of paying the original dev team with the items that Trent listed in this post as the roadmap. Through community discussion these can be adjusted/removed/added to as needed.

I quite agree with this idea, and I would like to make some Suggestions:

  1. Whether can be out from under the vault of quite a number of flow pool of mot as reward, let more people to join to provide liquidity pools are rewarded, thus can greatly increase the depth of the liquid pool, but also promote the vault is converted to a stable monetary impact on liquidity, has increased the enthusiasm to join the yearly check to provide liquidity, very apt to price stability, rapid appreciation and vault.Although the vaults have lost some of their money in the liquidity pool in return, they have grown rapidly thanks to compound interest.

  2. Yam is proposed as a means of payment to developers in order to increase Yam’s usefulness and attractiveness, liquidity and influence.

As for the voting time of the proposal, it can be further shortened (like 24 hours) because there will be a 4 times rebased in 48 hours. The duration can be set by dividing the importance of the proposal, or by the total number of votes cast

use YAM was a good idea

As for rebase time, 24 hours may be better. Secondly, funds after rebase should not be sold immediately, but should be operated manually at a certain time point

Hi everyone,

SUMMARY: lets incentivize development, ideate and push Yam Crop Protection protocol, and pass RageQuit().

most of this TL;DR is reiterations of previous ideas which i think are important along with my reasonings.

i think it is paramount we push and pass a proposal that will begin generating additional cash flows (however small) for the YAM treasury asap. the sooner we get this ball rolling, the faster our holdings/treasury will compound and the harder it will become to compete.

this means im 100% in support of incentivizing developers and community members who contribute to development. if YAM has value (which i believe it certainly does) much of the value right now is its active community members. further, imo it would be contradictory to Yam if we did not establish these incentives right now. perhaps some sort of simple reward system where someone is rewarded YAM from the treasury if they contribute will suffice (obviously this depends on the work, wherein full time work and therefore full time compensation might become a consideration).

while we establish these incentives, i personally think we should push a proposal to vote on Yam Crop Protection. we’d generate arbiter fees (at the very least) with a product that has immediate pmf as well as deploy an extremely useful protocol from which everyone in the DeFi ecosystem can benefit… not just YAM holders (i bet WNXM holders who did not KYC would love to generate income… great ju-ju). im trying to think of the risks associated with creating and using these non-kyc’d insurance coverage pools (feel free to DM me)… would like to discuss this further and think communicating with nexus mutants would be prudent in this regard.

having said that, im not an insurance expert - i know nexus had to do a bunch of legal and regulatory research before launching - but assuming we follow a similar model as nexus which is arbiters are voting on the claims and providing coverage, it should be fine (?). again im not an insurance expert, i could be wrong. whatever the case, again, i think communicating with nexus mutants to walk through potential risks would be prudent.

i would also like to push forward with the RageQuit (). right now some potential YAM holders cannot overlook the treasury purchases mechanism - YAM holders receive 90% of the newly minted supply and the treasury keeps 10% - they view this as an automatic 10% loss. incorporating the RageQuit () will help mitigate these concerns. i view this as a short-term cosmetics improvement that will appeal to more defi users (I believe other short-term cosmetics such as rebasing/treasury mechanisms, frequencies, and %'s will become more clear as we gather more data).


Fundamentally, I agree all of these protocol optimizations will be important to incorporate into Yam over the coming weeks. After that though, I believe we should have some way to contract blockchain engineers, advisors, and experts to accountably work on Yam’s protocol.

If there was a governance model that created incentives for people to improve Yam’s protocol, that would be great. Yam’s market capitalization can increase with the following feedback loop:

  1. Positive rebase increases treasury holdings.
  2. Yam community members vote on proposals to add new functionalities to Yam’s protocol.
  3. Yam partners with a protocol to contract blockchain engineers to quickly program such proposals.
  4. Proposal gets implemented, market cap increases from new elastic finance instrument deployment, positive rebase increases treasury holdings…

Elastic finance is early and has almost no competition, instruments, or recognition. Creating any instrument in elastic finance would increase Yam’s presence in leading the DeFi space and help fund the treasury.

In the long term, I believe exploring elastic lending, derivatives, and insurance would be the best play. In the short term, however, I believe we should add a DeFi protocol (Uma, Aave, or Nexus Mutal) into Yam’s ecosystem. Building a new elastic ecosystem from scratch may take months and I think Yam urgently needs a financial instrument to utilize a temporary use case while longer-term projects are developed.


+1 RageQuit, gives a direct, fundamental value (not just indirect governance value) and will help establish a rising price floor (currently there is no bottom support). (YFI had this on launch day, although few used it, I remember the fact that it was there in theory helped establish week 1 price floor.)

–> We should base it on time held x amount, not just amount. 1) promotes long-term gov participation and rewards early supporters (currently bleeding since launch) 2) discourages pump and dump (buy and burn) arb traders. “Time Held” = number of rebase cycles

  • Take the farming theme one step further: what if you can only ragequit after holding for a minimum time period like a week or month? Or 90 rebase cycles? Just like real crops.

–> Should the name be RageQuit? Seems to go against the design ethos of a friendly, welcoming farm. Perhaps TimeToHarvest or HarvestSeason or CropBurn or CandiedYam or something?

Treasury strategy:
–> This can be a full-time team just dedicated to treasury strategy and hunting alpha
–> Innovation: Having a treasury that simply does yUSD type investments is not innovative and does not provide anything new to the market. A treasury fund that has a unique strategy to invest in non-standard pools could be very attractive. Yearn Vaults make farming automatic and easy. Yam Treasury could make complex/emerging new markets automatic and eary. Such as:

  • NFT art (what if we became the biggest art dealer? lol)
  • NFT insurance futures
  • “Day 2” farming (flash audit and invest in newly launched farms; Yearn doesn’t do this, too risky)
  • YAM VC treasury fund investing in pre-launch of promising projects --> this has a really great story of ecosystem building
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Is there a specific reason why we wouldn’t want YAM holders to always be the arbiters… to basically connect/tie this insurance product to YAM more directly? If we’re gonna be spending YAM funds to build this out (which I think makes sense), I’d love to see some value always accrue back to YAM. I’d like to see this become a YAM product. I’d like the success/growth of this product more directly related to the success/growth of the YAM treasury (which means growth of the YAM token).

Furthermore, it seems unrealistic to expect that there is no governance on this protocol. There are many params that might need to fine-tuned and changed over time. For example, the breakdown of the premium distribution between insurance pool, PCF holders, and arbiters. That might need adjustments as we learn and go live.

I think this protocol needs governance to improve and progress. Why not let YAM token holders govern this protocol, since it’s a financial primitive that was homegrown on the YAM farm?


An excellent outline of opportunities. I’ll be referencing this frequently.

I’m in agreement with Mick and others. Prioritize fixing governance/liquidity issue and starting discussion on contributor compensation. The first is fairly straightforward. For the second, I’m very much in agreement with Mick. We need attractive compensation for our people.The sooner we get the discussion started the sooner we can make that happen. I would also caution against bloat here going forward, as I think it’s crucial to remain lean as I expect that will be a significant edge over competitors.

Then, beyond any other straightforward items like fundraising optimizations, I think we should prioritize YCP to secure a cash flow as quickly as possible. Things like strategic investments and yield strategies should definitely be pursued, but they should be peripheral and in support of YCP.


I’m coming to think of it like this. Yam finance is creating a protocol that it (or anyone) can use to create a market to sell services as an arbiter and/or cover provider.

So one argument for allowing anyone to be an arbiter (or cover provider) is it might significantly increase the availability of coverage across the whole Ethereum ecosystem because it won’t be strictly limited to Yam finance’s resources. This also serves to decentralize the defi insurance ecosystem further, which also keeps with the longstanding, broader Ethereum ethos.

Furthermore, it seems unrealistic to expect that there is no governance on this protocol. There are many params that might need to fine-tuned and changed over time. For example, the breakdown of the premium distribution between insurance pool, PCF holders, and arbiters. That might need adjustments as we learn and go live.

That’s a good point. Could consider a Uniswap model of v1, v2 and so on? Either way, adjustments might be useful, but I don’t think they would be totally necessary.

I’m not sure YCP needs much governance. It’s the classic crypto argument of: more open or less? On average, more open wins in this space.

I support this idea - I think RageQuit implies a failure or negativity of some kind that we don’t necessarily want to put out there.

It’s less about answering the question, “can we do this without governance?” and more about the question, “how can value accrue to YAM holders/treasury?”

There is no doubt this could be a great public utility to whole ecosystem. There is no doubt there may be a way to do this with minimal governance…

But why? Why would we not be exploring and brainstorming and discovering ways that the success of this protocol can mean the success of YAM?

Let’s use this as an opportunity for YAM. That’s what we should be looking for. The treasury is not 100% for altruistic public goods. We already earmarked 1% for that. Now it’s about accruing value to YAM treasury and its holders.

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is it might significantly increase the availability of coverage across the whole Ethereum ecosystem because it won’t be strictly limited to Yam finance’s resources.

Sorry I should’ve expanded a bit more here. Increasing the potential coverage overall could be a huge boon to Yam, not just Ethereum. Here are a two major reasons why:

  • Accelerates growth of defi overall, thus growing the whole pie, rather than just our slice
  • Buys goodwill and trust, which as an arbiter might prove to be invaluable

I think in the short term, success or failure, as it pertains to minimum governance or maximum governance, would probably be the same for either scenario. That’s because we will have first mover advantage in this new, non-KYC smart contract coverage market. I expect all the fees for arbitration to go to Yam finance for a long time.

So, your question of

But why? Why would we not be exploring and brainstorming and discovering ways that the success of this protocol can mean the success of YAM?

I think we are and I think this possibility is an important possibility to consider.

The treasury is not 100% for altruistic public goods.

100% agree here. Bit of a strawman. :slight_smile:

Def, I’m in agreement with @Wigglez. It’s beneficial for YAM holders to arbiters by default on the Yam Crop Protection protocol.

I just think YAM will need an easy way to opt-out and appoint a different arbiter when conflicts of interest arise:

  1. When the YAM Treasury serves as Initial Seeders
  2. When the YAM Treasury purchases Insurance Protection
  3. When the Insurance Pool insures a YAM contract


Important to keep in mind, we can always be forked out, either way.

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i’ve went ahead and did up a live treasury tracker to have better visuals on the growth of the treasury.
Do reach me out on discord for feedback or additional improvements. Thanks



Great discussion.

I would like to add some thoughts to the Treasury Management section.

Regarding how to use the treasury, I want to suggest two additional potential opportunities:

  1. Governance Black Hole: This is a proposal I originally made for Yearn, but I think it applies perfectly to YAM. TL;DR: Farm not to dump, but to retain a governance stake over the most promising farmable projects.
  2. Community-owned VC: Part of the treasury could be dedicated to make early investments in DeFi/Web3 projects. In this sense, this would be similar to TheLAO or Metacartel Ventures, with the significant difference that this would be the first fairly launched VC DAO in the space.

Additionally, I think we should also start discussing what’s the best way to manage (operate) the treasury going forward:

  1. What use cases do we want to pursue? Current discussion.
  2. How much do we allocate to each vertical we want to pursue?
  3. What’s the best way to structure the team around these verticals?

Just saw this tweet regarding this idea.


  1. I like this a lot. I read your original proposal. Do you have any suggestions on farmable projects to start? My main issue is that farming will likely be unsustainable and worrying about new opportunities isn’t worth it. FARM tries to automate that part, but I do not have high hopes for FARM long-term. I’d rather the treasury be used for substance as opposed to just monetary gain.

  2. Disagree. Down the road it makes sense, but to start, I like the idea of the treasury directing funds to the development of YAM-specific projects/products. In that sense, the community is investing in itself as opposed to outside, non-YAM projects. It can act as an accelerator/incubator and possibly as a platform that can continue to accrue value.