YIP-201 The Great Yamdemption Revised by Feddas

YIP-201 The Great Yamdemption Revised by Feddas

Basic Summary
This is an alternate proposal from the 1tx’s proposal to redeem the treasury

There has been some impropriety by 1tx, where he’s been offering to pay YAM token holders to vote for donating to his charity (Watoto) with un-redeemed treasury assets.

I, Feddas, have and will fight to try to create a self-sustaining long term Yam DAO, see YIP-200 but I do understand that people want to redeem their YAM tokens for the Treasury.

I am proposing the same thing without donating any un-redeemed treasury assets. Any token holders at the end of the redemption period can choose to do what they want to with the treasury assets.

Motivation - Why am I proposing it?

  1. Un-redeemed treasury funds are not anyone’s to give away, they belong to the YAM token holder. They should do with it what they please.
  2. Anyone choosing to redeem has exited and given up their governance rights, they cannot decide for the others.

Specifications

  1. Vote for all of the options you would like to see happen. The highest voted choice will be the decision.
  2. If we decide to redeem the treasury, We will need to hire a smart contract dev to fork / edit / deploy a similar smart contract contract used by Lobis to redeem the treasury. Any associated costs will be voted on. Open invitation for anyone to take over this responsibility, but as the proposer, it will default to me. I would like to be ready to deploy within 30 days.
  3. I’ve included multiple lengths of redemption, please vote for all that is acceptable to you. The longer it is the longer it will take to resume Yam operations. In order to maintain Yam services like hosting / discord / forums allocate $500 per month during redemption to operations multisig.
  4. Before redemption any owed compensation, owed dues and approved silos must be paid out in its entirity to leave no liabilities. Full disclosure, this includes the remaining milestones for my silo (unable to complete due to redemption) Silo-02: Yam Treasury Management and Maintenance Framework Silo which is part of YIP-114 and YIP-200. If the community wants me to rework YIP 114 and YIP 200 with the new treasury I will do so.

Voting Options Select All That Apply - Highest voted wins
https://snapshot.org/#/yam.eth/proposal/0x38c6e48be58c03da0546b0d4a648d4228cf12e195c53b67a3798a73d3f2578b0

1 Like

wow really no one cares. anyways lets end this farce. vote how you like. thank you feddas for trying to make something for maybe those people that come back in a year+ and have a nice little treasury waiting for them with their yam tokens.

Thank you for writing and proposing this, Feddas. Def agreed.

If we assume that a portion of the treasury that is not claimed comes from lost YAM then those who intentionally do not redeem will have a greater extractable value per YAM after the redemption. There is a risk in a naive implementation of this plan that while trying to prevent any particular group from deciding what gets done with this “lost” portion of the treasury, it becomes easier for a malicious party to do a second redemption and claim all those treasury funds after the majority have claimed pro-rata. If we do not know who will redeem beforehand, it is impossible to tell whether they will act in the best interests of these lost funds once they have control over them.

In order to mitigate this, YAM’s guardian would need to continue operating (again a hard thing to assume if the expectation is most will redeem and move on) or the “lost” funds in the treasury would need to be moved to a new treasury or contract that can only be claimed pro-rata.

If the DAO actually cares about the rights of these “lost” token holders then this proposal needs more work to make that true in practice as well as in theory. There are solutions to this problem but they should be discussed before and part of the redemption conversation and are far more important that simply picking the length of time redemption is allowed.

If you want to offer up solutions please do so. Ultimately the decision should be with the rest of the token holders who do not redeem and not up to those that will be redeeming. I will be happy to vote with the guardian if a malicious proposal ever comes up to steal remaining treasury funds.

Feddas

The solution is to stick with the intent of the original proposal, which opts to donate the treasury to some DAO chosen initiative.

This is the only framing that is consistent with how the DAO has operated since inception:

Token holders have the right to vote on how the treasury is spent. The treasury does not belong to any particular person and it is not your money, my money, or anyone else’s money. It is the DAO’s money. This vote should not be a vote whether to redeem or not. It is a vote to spend the DAO treasury on some initiative (that may be a charity or something else, like a slimmed down version of YAM per YIP-200).

The DAO would vote on how it wants to move forward and then provide the means for token holders to OPT OUT of that decision by allowing them to redeem their YAM for a pro-rata share of the treasury. They are given the opportunity to say “NO” I don’t want the portion of the treasury tied to my voting power used this way. Everyone has the same opportunity and if the time period in which to opt out is acceptably long then this is entirely fair. You can only vote on what is done with the treasury as a whole, or on your particular pro-rata share.

There is no way to know who has control of their tokens so allowing an opt out (redemption) is the only fair way to do this. But the decision is not to allow redemption, it is the decision of what is to be done with the treasury, with redemption being a way to give a voice to those who disagree, but don’t have the votes to change the outcome.

So with this framing, the decision to be made is: “What is to be done with the YAM treasury?” And once that is decided, how do we craft a contract that allows those who do not wish to participate in that action to exit with with the portion represented by their token ownership.

If we assume that all options include a pro-rata redemption (essentially a ragequit) then the decision is to choose between the options for how the treasury is spent.

Ross,

  1. The vote to donate failed. There are also multiple people in the community besides me and jpgs who are against it and have spoken out without adequate response. There is obviously no consensus in what you are offering. Why continue to push the narrative? Is there some sort of benefit for you? Are you virtual signaling?
  2. Again if people want to donate their funds to a charity, they are welcome to do so with their own funds. They can redeem and then send that money to charity of their choice.
  3. Your forcing people to either redeem or let their share be donated. Not everyone wants only those options, maybe some people want to continue the DAO. Its a possibility that you cannot rule out.
  4. A redemption will allow anyone to “ragequit” without effecting anyone else’s share, why can’t this just be the result? No one suffers loses in a plain redeem.
  5. If there needs to be further protections for the Treasury after the redemption, then we can add participating members to a guardian multisig.

Why are you so insistent on forcing a result?

Feddas

I believe the YAM experiment has failed and depositing the treasury into Yearn and proceeding to do nothing with it is less valuable than donating the treasury to a cause that furthers the mission of the DAO. This is why I proposed Gitcoin grants. I’m arguing that point and will continue to do so until someone proposes something better than what has currently been proposed. I don’t view YIP-200 to be a good plan.

Maybe someone wants to fund terrorism or spend it all on a big ice cream party. It’s a possibility that I can’t rule out, but it doesn’t change my argument. You can appeal to all sorts of imaginary causes if you like, but it doesn’t make them worth considering.

I’m proposing that YAM should be shut down and the best way to do that is by donating all the funds to Gitcoin and allowing redemptions beforehand.

Your entitled to your belief. Obviously there are people that don’t agree.

Therefor you will be allowed to redeem your pro-rata share and leave, if and when the redemption snapshot passes.

Good bye.

I disagree, Ross - there is deep value in maintaining the Yam Treasury sensibly, keeping overhead low, and allowing the DAO to survive until the next Bull Market.

With sensible treasury management, the DAO should have more options to explore down the road. It’s a lower risk / higher reward path forward imho.

1 Like

donation vote was already denied.

voting to take treasury funds that have been allocated to those token holder via a redeem is THEFT.

What I am missing from all these proposals is any clarity on what that “deep value” you mention actually is and what the DAO will do once it survives to the next bull market?

Feddas lays out the problem in Yip-200

We have known this is the problem for over a year. Is the expectation that if we just wait long enough someone will come around and have a great plan for YAM to actually do something? What incentive is there to propose anything when there is a culture of no risk taking that refuses to fund or support anyone who tries and doesn’t immediately succeed?

If feddas and jpgs were proposing that they are going shut down expenses while they go out and build a team to do “X” (don’t even care what X is, but something!) then that would at least be a plan that could be considered. Instead there is a plan to do nothing. Maybe they are working on something, but nothing has been proposed.

Is a zombie YAM really better than a dead YAM? I would like to be convinced why a zombie YAM is better than just saying “we tried and failed, time to pull the plug and start over.” And at the same time allow redemptions while helping projects that do have a plan to build something get funding via gitcoin grants.

Lol you pasted the “problem” part of YIP 200 but not the “solution”.
Feel free to read the whole thing.

If the solution isn’t for you, it doesn’t mean others can’t do it.

ah yes, the solution you propose:

I would love to hear an actual proposal on how you plan to do this. This is only a solution to fix the problem I quoted above if you actually find those projects (none of the other “solutions” in YIP-200 even tackle it). I have been in meetings with you where you have asked me and others how “we” should go out and find projects that will solve this problem. You consistently frame this problem as something “we” need to solve while at no point providing any solutions yourself.

Well, you have fired everyone else, so now it is up to you to propose what to do beyond investing the treasury in Yearn.

Sure I will do this exact thing once the redemption process is approved or denied. Redemption has a material effect on the assets of Yam and until it is resolved, options are limited.

I don’t like this characterizations of “Zombie Yam.”

We’re in a bear market - it’s sensible to keep overhead low and hibernate until the market turns around. Brainstorming and development of ideas for Yam can occur in parallel, but not at the cost of spending treasury.

It’s protecting the treasury and going minimal so that Yam can be set up for better things in the future.

This proposal is missing many things, its a copy from the previous proposal where it only takes what youve picked and posted without collaborating with the proposer, i dont see it of any values nor do support it.

  1. If this proposal is missing many things, then the original is missing many things.
  2. You try to collaborate with the proposer. See if he will fix them and post a new one.

Feddas